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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal arises from a civil action brought by plaintiff/appellant Geri Pasquin ("Mrs.
Pasquin") for declaratory relief (relating to her allegation that she is a partner in Quality Parts,
and has an interest in the assets thereof), breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice, breach of
employment contract, intentional interference with employment contract and intentional
infliction of emotion distress.
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court based upon
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)(j)(1995 Sup.)
and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This case was poured over to the Utah
Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court.
The order granting summary judgment to the Estate of Kory Pasquin ("Pasquin Estate")
was executed on October 21, 1997. The order granting summary judgment to John Pasquin,
Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. (the "Pasquin
Defendants") was executed on November 3,1997. The order granting summary judgment to
Thomas Duffin and Daniel Duffin (The "Duffin Defendants") was executed on November 17,
1997. An amended order granting summary judgment to the Duffin Defendants was executed
on November 26, 1997. The Order Denying Plaintiffs Objection to Proposed Summary
Judgment of Duffin Defendants was executed on December 19, 1997. The Minute Entry Ruling
declaring plaintiffs objection to the language of the Duffin Defendants' proposed Summary
Judgment to be untimely was executed on November 18, 1997. The Minute Entry Ruling
denying Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and to Vacate the Summary Judgment of Pasquin
Related Defendants was executed on December 18, 1997.
1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was it reversible error for Judge Fredericks to rule that Mrs. Pasquin's claim of an

interest in an oral partnership was barred under the Statute of Frauds in light of Mrs. Pasquin's
sworn testimony that she became a partner immediately with the knowledge and consent of all
partners, including John Pasquin? Related thereto, is an oral partnership agreement rendered
unenforceable simply because the partnership contemplates existing longer than one year ? Are
all oral partnerships rendered unenforceable if the partnerships operate or contemplate operating
for more than one year?
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory
Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, and Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162,
2.

Was it error for Judge Fredericks to rule that there was no writing satisfying the

Statute of Frauds with respect to Geri Pasquin's claim of an employment-for-life agreement
given the undisputed fact that the entities against which this employment agreement was sought
to be enforced, the Quality Parts partnership and its successor corporation, answered an
interrogatory admitting the existence of the employment-for-life promise and John Pasquin's
statement reaffirming and committing to honor said agreement? Does an express, written
acknowledgment of what otherwise was an oral agreement by way of an interrogatory answer
constitute a "writing" sufficient to take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds?
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory
Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, and Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162.
2

3.

Was it reversible error for Judge Fredericks to rule that the Statute of Frauds

barred Mrs. Pasquin's partnership and employment-for-life claims given the fact that Mrs.
Pasquin's opposing memoranda set forth verified statements of disputed facts which supported
her claims that a factually intensive exception to the Statute of Frauds is present in this case,
and/or that the defendants should be estopped for asserting said defense?
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory
Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, and Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162.
4.

Was it reversible error for Judge Fredericks to essentially rule that even though

Mrs. Pasquin had opposed the motions with detailed sworn statements of disputed facts, the
defendants' motions were not opposed by any "affidavits?" Is a factual statement in a
memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, which is verified under oath, the
equivalent of an "affidavit" under Rule 56?
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory
Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162, Mrs. Pasquin's
Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Duffin Defendants, R. 179-180, Mrs.
Pasquin's Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Pasquin Defendants (John Pasquin,
Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.), R. 189-191, and
Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry Dated November 18, 1997 and to
Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed Summary Judgment, R. 208-211.
4.

Was it reversible error for Judge Fredericks to grant the motions for summary
3

judgment in light of the fact that Mrs. Pasquin's verified statements of disputed facts in
opposition to the motions clearly demonstrated that there were material facts in dispute which
needed to be resolved at trial?
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory
Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162, Mrs. Pasquin's
Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Duffin Defendants, R. 179-180, Mrs.
Pasquin's Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Pasquin Defendants (John Pasquin,
Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.), R. 189-191, and
Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry Dated November 18,1997 and to
Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed Summary Judgment, R. 208-211.
5.

Was it reversible error for Judge Frederick's to deny Mrs. Pasquin's Rule 56(f)

motion for more time to conduct discovery on the grounds that Mrs. Pasquin had failed to timely
conduct discovery, when the facts were clear that (a) most relevant documents were in the
possession of the defendants, especially the Pasquin Related Defendants, (b) Mrs. Pasquin had
served discovery requests and notices of deposition upon the defendants months before, but (c)
the defendants had failed to provide the requested discovery or submit themselves to deposition
due to an assertion that John Pasquin had been injured and could not participate in discovery?
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of
Kory Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162, Mrs. Pasquin's
Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Duffin Defendants, R. 179-180, Mrs.
4

Pasquin's Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Pasquin Defendants (John Pasquin,
Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.), R. 189-191, and
Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry Dated November 18, 1997 and to
Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed Summary Judgment, R. 208-211.
6.

Did Judge Fredericks incorrectly construe and apply the rules for computation of

time with respect to the filing of Mrs. Pasquin's objection to the language of the Pasquin
Defendants' summary judgment?
Preserved for appeal in Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry
Dated November 18,1997 and to Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed
Summary Judgment, R. 208-211
7.

Was it error for Judge Fredericks to deny Mrs. Pasquin's Motion to Reconsider

and Vacate the order granting the Pasquin Defendants summary judgment?
Preserved for appeal in Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry
Dated November 18, 1997 and to Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed
Summary Judgment, R. 208-211
8.

Was it error for Judge Fredericks to grant orders dismissing all of Mrs. Pasquin's

claims against the defendants even though the defendants' Statute of Frauds and other challenges
were dispositive as to certain of Mrs. Pasquin's claims?
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of
Kory Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 87-112, Mrs. Pasquin's other memoranda
opposing the defendants' motions for summary judgment, R. 143-148,155-162, Mrs. Pasquin's
Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Duffin Defendants, R. 179-180, Mrs.
5

Pasquin's Objection to Proposed Summary Judgment of the Pasquin Defendants (John Pasquin,
Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc.), R. 189-191, and
Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration Re Minute Entry Dated November 18,1997 and to
Vacate Execution of the Pasquin Defendants' Proposed Summary Judgment, R. 208-211.
Standard of Review: The granting of the motions for summary judgment was based
upon issues of law, and the Supreme Court accords no deference to the trial court's resolution of
the legal issues presented. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P. 2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).

This

Court determines "whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the
trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of fact." State v. Ferre. 784 P. 2d
149, 151 (Utah 1989). The denial of Mrs. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motions should be reviewed to
determine of the trial court abused its discretion, with deference given to the trial court's
determinations unless they were clearly erroneous.
RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Mrs. Pasquin believes that the proper interpretation and application of the following
Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and/or regulations to this appeal may well
be determinative:
Constitutional provisions: None.
Statutes:
U.C.A. 25-5-4 "Certain agreements void unless in written and signed.
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or
memorandum of the agreement is in writing, signed by the party to be charged
with the agreement:
(1) every agreement which by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making of the agreement.

6

U.C.A. 48-1-15 "Rules determining rights and duties of partners.
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be
determined, subject to any agreement between, by the following rules:
(7) No person can become a member of the partnership without the
consent of all the partners.
Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 5. Service andfilingof pleadings and other papers.
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules,
every order... and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties....
(b) Service: How made. (1) Whenever under these rules service is
required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the
service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is
ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by
delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address ....
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a
party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time
thereafter....
Rule 6. Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed
by these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated
period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so
computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday,
in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or
allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right
or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.

Rule 12(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings.
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial,
7

any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded
by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Rule 56 Summary Judgment
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. ... The [summary] judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law....
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to
be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other
order as is just.
Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 4-501 (2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and
shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the movant
8

relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a
genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portion of the record upon which the
opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in
the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the
record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees.
(2) Copies of the proposed ... orders shall be served upon opposing
counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and
counsel within five days after service.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case involves allegations by Mrs. Pasquin that she was asked by her son Kory
Pasquin, with the knowledge and consent of her ex-husband and Kory's father, John Pasquin, to
join them as a partner in Quality Parts and to come to work for the business. After she became a
partner, she began working for Quality Parts for minimum wage only and worked diligently to
build the business. Mrs. Pasquin was promised by her partners, Kory and John, that she would
be employed for life, and receive salary and benefits commensurate with that received by the
other partners. The business conducted by the partnership was later incorporated, and Mrs.
Pasquin was assured by Kory and John that her partnership interest would carry over into the
corporation. Shortly thereafter, Kory Pasquin was killed in a boating accident. After Kory's
death, John Pasquin asked Mrs. Pasquin to attend a meeting at the offices of Quality Parts'

9

attorneys, the defendants' Duffm. In this meeting, John asserted for the first time that Mrs.
Pasquin can ever remember that she was not an owner in the business. The business' accountant,
Boyd Simper, who was present in the meeting, objected that "Geri is a part of the company."
John acknowledged that Mrs. Pasquin had been promised lifetime employment, and stated that
he, Quality Parts and Quality Transport would honor that commitment and agreement.
When Mrs. Pasquin refused to agree that she was not an owner in the business, the
defendants took various actions which Mrs. Pasquin believes were wrongful. She filed the
instant suit seeking a determination of her rights in the partnership, the new successor
corporation, and the assets of both of them, and to her promised lifetime employment; seeking
damages for breach of fiduciary duty by her partners, John and Kory (via Kory's Estate); seeking
damages for breach of fiduciary duty by what she believed were her attorneys, the Duffins;
seeking damages for breach of her employment agreement arising from the partnership's and/or
new corporation's failure to pay her promised wages, failure to give her promised perquisites,
and failure to withhold and/or pay her taxes, among other things; seeking damages against
certain individuals for intentional interference with her contract with the partnership and/or the
new corporation; and seeking damages for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
Mrs. Pasquin served sets of discovery requests upon the defendants in the Spring of 1997,
and then notices of the defendants' depositions. The Pasquin Defendants answered Mrs.
Pasquin's interrogatories admitting that Kory Pasquin had asked Mrs. Pasquin to come to work
for the business and had promised her employment-for-life, and that John Pasquin, in the
meeting at the Duffins' offices referred to above, had admitted the existence of this agreement
10

and reaffirmed it. The Duffin Defendants tendered the production of what limited documents
that they had, but before any documents were produced by the partnership and new corporation,
and before depositions could be taken, defendant John Pasquin suffered serious head injuries in a
fall from the roof of the businesses' building. The Pasquin Defendants requested several openended extensions of time to produce documents and to appear at depositions until John Pasquin
recovered enough to assist in that discovery.
Before Mrs. Pasquin could obtain access to these potentially critical business documents,
or take essential depositions, the Pasquin Estate filed a motion for summary judgment. The
motion was no supported by any affidavits. It cited only to portions of Mrs. Pasquin's
complaint, and then claimed that Mrs. Pasquin could not prevail on any of her claims because the
Statute of Frauds barred the enforcement of oral agreements which take more than one year to
perform. Specifically, the Pasquin Estate claimed that the oral partnership and employment-forlife agreement alleged by Mrs. Pasquin in her complaint both required more than one year to
perform, such that claims related thereto were barred by the Statute of Frauds.
The Duffin Defendants (the attorneys), joined in the Pasquin Estate's motion, with no
separate memorandum or statement of undisputed fact. The Duffin Defendants did, however,
submit affidavits from Thomas and Daniel Duffin. These affidavits stated that these attorneys
had never performed services directly for Mrs. Pasquin, that when they performed services for
the partnership and new corporation they did not know or believe that they were providing
services to Mrs. Pasquin, that there were no writings memorializing or documenting Mrs.
Pasquin's claims that she was a partner in Quality Parts or that she had an employment-for-life
agreement with the partnership and/or new corporation.
11

Mrs. Pasquin filed a Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory Pasquin's Motion
for Summary Judgment which contained a "Statement of Disputed Facts." Rather than submit a
separate affidavit restating the same facts, Mrs. Pasquin signed a sworn statement verifying
under the penalty of perjury the truthfulness and accuracy of the statements made in her
Statement of Disputed Facts. This verified memorandum in opposition disputed the Pasquin
Estate's brief statements of fact and asserted that the partnership interest had been granted to
Mrs. Pasquin immediately, and with the knowledge and consent of John Pasquin, such that the
Statute of Frauds was not even applicable. Further, Mrs. Pasquin argued that the Pasquin
Defendants' answers to interrogatories constituted a writing which sufficiently acknowledged
and memorialized the employment-for-life agreement to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds. Mrs. Pasquin finally pointed out that there were claims for relief against the Pasquin
Estate and other defendants with respect to which the Statute of Frauds defense asserted by the
Pasquin Estate did not even apply. Mrs. Pasquin attached copies of documents and the
interrogatory answers which she asserted supported her averments of fact and arguments of law.
Mrs. Pasquin filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Duffm's Joinder To The
Estate of Kory Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Motion. This
memorandum incorporated by reference Her memorandum in opposition to the Pasquin Estate's
motion, and made the additional arguments (1) that the agreement by the partners, Kory and
John, to make Mrs. Pasquin a partner could be and was oral, (2) that for the purposes of the
motions for summary judgment, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony that she was in fact so made a
partner with the knowledge and consent of John Pasquin had to be assumed to be true for the
purposes of the motions; (3) that the factually intensive doctrines of "partial performance" and
12

"equitable estoppel," as supported by Mrs. Pasquin's sworn factual averments (which were also
required to be assumed to be true for the purposes of the motions), precluded the granting of
summary judgment on the defendants' Statute of Frauds defense; (4) that the Statue of Frauds
requires only that there be some writing which clearly references the claimed agreement which is
by the party to be charged; and (5) that the partnership's and new corporation's signed
interrogatory answers which acknowledged an employment-for-life agreement and that these
entities had reaffirmed that agreement in a meeting at the attorneys' offices satisfied the Statute
of Frauds.
The Pasquin Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment, submitted a
memorandum of points and authorities which incorporated therein the arguments of the Pasquin
Estate. The Pasquin Defendants' memorandum contained no statement of undisputed facts.
However, the Pasquin Defendants submitted an affidavit from John Pasquin in which he
disputed Mrs. Pasquin's version of the facts. The Pasquin Defendants' memorandum incredibly
argued that part of Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony related to statements and promises made
primarily by Kory Pasquin, and that since Kory is now deceased, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn
testimony in these regards should not be believed. (Attached hereto as Exhibit A are copies of
affidavits of third-parties with respect to what these individuals heard Kory Pasquin promise
Mrs. Pasquin) The Pasquin Defendants also asserted that since John Pasquin's affidavit
disputed Mrs. Pasquin's sworn statements of disputed fact, the Pasquin Defendants' motion for
summary judgment should be granted. These two arguments are totally inconsistent with the
legal requirement that the facts have to be construed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motions for summary judgment, and that if the moving parties' material facts are
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disputed, the motions must be denied.
The Pasquin Defendants' memorandum also argued that an employment-for-life
agreement is very unusual and can only be established under unusual circumstances. Mrs.
Pasquin appreciated the fact that these defendants' memorandum acknowledged that
employment-for-life agreements have been found enforceable. Mrs. Pasquin's memorandum in
opposition to this motion incorporated her prior memoranda in opposition to the other
defendants' joined motion for summary judgment, and argued that the facts that she verified
under oath satisfied the requirements for finding an employment-for-life agreement as set forth in
the cases cited by the Pasquin Defendants.
The reply memoranda of the Duffin Defendants and the Pasquin Defendants claimed
incorrectly, among other things, that Mrs. Pasquin had not submitted "affidavits" opposing the
defendants' statement of undisputed fact. This was an interesting argument given that (1) only
the Pasquin Estate's initial memorandum had a "statement of undisputed fact," (2) the Pasquin
Estate's statement referred only to paragraphs in Mrs. Pasquin's own complaint and was not
accompanied by any affidavits whatsoever, and (3) Mrs. Pasquin's various memoranda either set
forth separately and/or through incorporation by reference detailed "statements of disputed
facts," verified under oath and penalty of perjury by Mrs. Pasquin, which were the functional
equivalent of "opposing affidavits."
Rather than deal with the defendants' joined motions at the same time, and even while
Mrs. Pasquin was still briefing the later-filed motions, Judge Frederick began ruling on the
motions separately ~ initially issuing a minute order granting the Pasquin Estate's motion "for
the reasons set forth in the memoranda," and ultimately granting all the other defendants'
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motions. Mrs. Pasquin objected to the language of the proposed orders granting summary
judgment to the Duffm Defendants and the Pasquin Defendants. Judge Frederick never ruled on
her objection to the Duffm Defendants' summary judgment. Judge Frederick signed the Pasquin
Defendants' proposed order before the time had even run for Mrs. Pasquin to submit her
objections thereto, and then ruled that Mrs. Pasquin's objection had been filed too late. Mrs.
Pasquin disagreed with Judge Frederick's application of the Rules relating to the computation of
the time for filing objections, and therefore filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Vacate
with respect to the Pasquin Defendants' summary judgment. Judge Fredericks denied this
motion. Mrs. Pasquin filed this appeal seeking to reverse the granting of all of the defendants'
motions for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mrs. Pasquin was approached by her son, Kory Pasquin, and asked to come to

work for and be a partner in Quality Parts with him and his father, Mrs. Pasquin's ex-husband,
John Pasquin. Kory told her that he, Kory, was handling sales, that John was handling the
service/repair part of the business, and that Geri would handle the office. John Pasquin was
aware of and consented to Mrs. Pasquin becoming a partner in Quality Parts (Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to The Estate of Kory Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment
("Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition Mem."), Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R.
87, 94-95; Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Duffins' Joinder To The Estate
of Kory Pasquin's Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Motion ("Plaintiffs Duffin
Opposition Mem."), p. 2, R. 144; Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' John
Pasquin, Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. Motion
15

for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Motion ("Plaintiffs Pasquin Defendants Opposition
Mem."), p. 2, R. 156)
2.

Mrs. Pasquin agreed to become a partner and came to work for Quality Parts at

only minimum wage because she was told that she was a "partner" and that the partnership
needed to conserve money. Mrs. Pasquin's wages were not raised for three years. The
partnership paid for her health insurance, her car insurance and gas for her car. The partnership
did not withhold any taxes from her wages, but at the end of each year prepared her tax returns
and paid all of her accrued taxes. (Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition Mem., Statement of
Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87,94-95; Plaintiffs Duffin Opposition Mem., pp. 2-3, R.
144-45; Plaintiffs Pasquin Defendants Opposition Mem., pp. 2-5, R. 156-59)
3.

Mrs. Pasquin's services as manager of the office substantially contributed to the

success of Quality Parts. Her fiscal conservativeness enabled the partnership to save enough
money to purchase the land and building where the business is currently being operated.
Although Mrs. Pasquin had frequent run ins with John Pasquin, Kory constantly reassured her
that her contributions were essential to the success of the partnership's business and that she was
an important and valued partner; and, that when the business was sold, she would be able to
retire on her share of the proceeds. Kory also told Mrs. Pasquin that she, like John and himself,
were "employees for life" — that she would have a job at a commensurate salary and equivalent
benefits as himself and John for as long as she wanted. This induced Mrs. Pasquin to take the
job, become a partner, and work for low wages for years to build the business and make it
successful. Kory confirmed these promises and representations that he had made to Mrs. Pasquin
to several other people as well (Exhibit A attached hereto). (Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition
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Mem., Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87, 94-95; Plaintiffs Duffm Opposition
Mem., pp. 2-3, R. 144-45; Plaintiffs Pasquin Defendants Opposition Mem., pp. 2-5, R. 156-59)
4.

In early 1996, Kory and John incorporated the business, forming Quality

Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc. Mrs. Pasquin was led to believe by John and Kory that this
was something that the lawyers recommended and that her interest would be taken care of
therein. She trusted Kory and his promises. (Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition Mem.,
Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87, 95-6)
5.

In the Fall of 1996, Kory Pasquin was killed in a boating accident, without any

will and with two illegitimate minor children, by different mothers, as his direct heirs.
(Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition Mem., Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87,
96)
6.

Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Pasquin was called to attend a meeting at the offices of

the Duffin Defendants (who had been the partnership's attorneys, and had organized the
corporation). In this meeting, the attorneys said that John and Kory had been the only
shareholders of the corporation. The partnership and corporation's accountant protested, stating
that Mrs. Pasquin was a part of "the company." Mrs. Pasquin's daughter, Julie Flarrity, was in
attendance at the meeting and objected and stated that Kory had told her many times that Mrs.
Pasquin was an "equal partner" in the business and would be able to "retire when the business is
sold." John Pasquin acknowledged in front of all present that Kory had promised Mrs. Pasquin
continuous employment, and that this promise would be honored. (Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate
Opposition Mem., Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87, 97)
7.

However, John Pasquin refused to acknowledge that Mrs. Pasquin should have a
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one-third interest in Quality Parts and Quality Transport. Further, John Pasquin caused Quality
Parts and/or Quality Transport to thereafter reduce Mrs. Pasquin's wages, refuse to pay her
insurance any more, and refuse to prepare her tax returns and pay her taxes when they came due - all in violation of prior practice and agreements. John Pasquin told Mrs. Pasquin that he had
done all of the foregoing at the direction and insistence of his attorneys, the Duffin Defendants.
(Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition Mem., Statement of Disputed Facts, and Exhibit A, R. 87,
97-98)
8.

As a result, Mrs. Pasquin was forced to file suit seeking a determination of her

interest in the partnership and successor corporation and their assets; seeking an accounting;
seeking a declaration that she is entitled to employment-for-life as promised and agreed; seeking
damages for breach of her employment agreement (due to the reduction in her wages, to the
failure to pay her insurance, and failure to accrue, account for and pay her taxes); seeking
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress; seeking damages against the attorney's
for malpractice (if she is a partner, they were her attorneys and their actions were antagonistic to
her interests); seeking damages against the attorneys and John Pasquin for inducing the business
to breach their employment agreements with her; among other things. (Complaint, R. 1-15)
9.

Mrs. Pasquin served discovery requests upon all the defendants. R. 42,44, 58, 59,

67 The Pasquin Defendants answered the interrogatories and admitted that Mrs. Pasquin had
been promised lifetime employment and that John Pasquin on behalf of the partnership and new
corporation had reaffirmed that agreement in the meeting at the Duffins' office referred to in
paragraph 6 above. R. 66,108-112 The Duffin Defendants tendered what little documents they
possessed to Mrs. Pasquin, but the remaining defendants, despite repeated demands, did not
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tender or produce any documents to Mrs. Pasquin. Further, John Pasquin did not appear at his
deposition because he had an accident, suffered head injuries and claimed that he was not wellenough to appear and/or participate in discovery. R. 137,141,146-7,159.
10.

The Pasquin Estate filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that since the

agreement by which Mrs. Pasquin became a partner in Quality Parts was oral, and since the
employment-for-life agreement was also oral, the Statute of Frauds barred Mrs. Pasquin's suit.
This motion was not supported by any affidavits in support, but was instead based solely upon
references to the factual averments in Mrs. Pasquin's own complaint (Pasquin Estate Motion and
Memorandum, R. 74-79)
11.

Mrs. Pasquin opposed the motion by (i) incorporating by reference in her

statement of disputed facts all of the detailed allegations in her complaint, and by setting forth
certain other material disputed facts, (ii) by verifying under oath and penalty of perjury the
truthfulness of the incorporated allegations from her complaint as well as the additional factual
averments in her memorandum in opposition. Based upon those detailed and sworn/verified
"disputed facts," Mrs. Pasquin argued that the motion for summary judgment should be denied
because (iii) the partnership was formed instantly (and therefore did not fall under the statute of
frauds, (iv) there was a writing confirming that the employment-for-life agreement had been
made (the Pasquin Defendants' answers to interrogatories in which John Pasquin admitted that
Kory Pasquin had promised Mrs. Pasquin employment for life and that this promise/agreement
would be honored), and (v) that even if the agreements were somehow subject to the Statutes of
Frauds, there were various factually intensive exceptions to the Statute applicable to the instant
case which precluded the granting of summary judgment. (Plaintiffs Pasquin Estate Opposition
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Mem., R. 87-112)
12.

The Duffm Defendants, attorneys Thomas and Daniel Duffin, joined in the

Pasquin Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 80-86 Mrs. Pasquin opposed the Duffin
Defendants' joinder on the same basis as previously argued, plus by emphasizing that Mrs.
Pasquin's sworn statement of disputed facts supported the "partial performance" and "estoppel"
exceptions or defenses to the Statute of Frauds. Mrs. Pasquin also argued that there were causes
of action (such as for breach of employment agreement with respect to wages, benefits and taxes;
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and interference with contract, etc.) which were did
not rely on finding of an oral partnership and of the oral employment-for-life agreement for their
validity, and therefore could not be dismissed solely on the "statute of frauds" argument. R. 143148
13.

The Pasquin Defendants (the two Pasquins, the partnership and the corporation)

joined in the Pasquin Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Pasquin Defendants'
memorandum incredibly argued that part of Mrs. Pasquin's testimony related to statements and
promises made primarily by Kory Pasquin, and that since Kory is now deceased, Mrs. Pasquin's
sworn testimony somehow should not be believed. These defendants also asserted that since
John Pasquin's affidavit disputed Mrs. Pasquin's sworn statements of fact, the Pasquin
Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted. R. 121-130 Mrs. Pasquin
opposed it on the same bases as against both of the other motions for summary judgment, and
with her detailed sworn statements of disputed facts. R. 155-162
14.

The Duffin and Pasquin Defendants filed reply briefs in which they asserted that

Mrs. Pasquin had not filed an "opposing affidavit" ~ ignoring the fact that a verified factual
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statement disputed is the same as an affidavit - and claiming in part that summary judgment
should be granted as a result thereof. R. 135-142,165-169
15.

Judge Fredericks granted each of the motions for summary judgment "for the

reasons set forth" in the moving parties'memoranda. R. 153,172
16.

Mrs. Pasquin filed an objection to the proposed order granting summary judgment

to the Duffm Defendants, R. 179-180 which was never ruled on.
17.

On Thursday, October 23, 1997, the Pasquin Defendants mailed their proposed

order granting summary judgment to Mrs. Pasquin. R. 187-88. Under CJA, 4-504, objections are
to be submitted within five days. Under URCP 6, if the time period is less than seven days,
intervening weekends and holidays are not counted. Also under URCP 6, since the proposed
order was mailed, three days are added to the time period - essentially the proposed order is not
considered served for the first three business days. Given these rules, Mrs. Pasquin had until on
or before Tuesday, November 4,1997, to submit her objection. On Monday, November 3, 1997,
Mrs. Pasquin mailed and faxed her Objection to this proposed order to the defendants, and
mailed it to the Court for filing. R. 189-191, and Exhibit B attached hereto (which contains
copies of the FAX confirmation sheets showing that the objection was faxed to the defendants on
November 3, 1997). Judge Fredericks executed the Pasquin Defendants' proposed order granting
summary judgment on November 3,1997, before the time for objecting had even run. R. 186
Judge Fredericks issued a Minute Entry on November 18, 1997 in which he ruled that Mrs.
Pasquin's Objection to the Pasquin Defendants' proposed order was "untimely." R. 206
18.

Mrs. Pasquin filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the summary judgment

granted to the Duffm Defendants on the grounds that the objection had in fact been timely filed.
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R. 208-209
19.

Judge Fredericks denied the motion for reconsideration. R. 240 Mrs. Pasquin

filed her notice of appeal. R. 221-222.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The motions for summary judgment should never have been granted The Duffin
Defendants were simply wrong when they asserted in their Reply brief that Mrs. Pasquin cannot
incorporate the allegations of her complaint and then verify them under oath as part of her
statements of disputed fact. A verified statement of disputed fact, for the purposes of a motion
for summary judgment, is the functional equivalent of an affidavit. Mrs. Pasquin's verified
statements of disputed fact were detailed and not only supported her claims for relief, but also
disputed the defendants' assertions of material fact. With the material facts in dispute, it was
clearly inappropriate for Judge Frederick to have granted the motions for summary judgment.
The Pasquin Estate's original motion for summary judgment (which was joined in by all
the other defendants) was based solely on the allegations in Mrs. Pasquin's complaint, and
claimed that even if those allegations were true Mrs. Pasquin's claims for relief were barred by
the Statute of Frauds (essentially a motion for judgment on the pleadings). That aspect of the
defendants' motions for summary judgment relating to a purely legal Statute of Frauds challenge
to Mrs. Pasquin's partnership claims should have been summarily denied because oral
partnerships are not rendered unenforceable simply because the partnerships contemplate being
in existence longer than one year. In the face of Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony that she had
been admitted as a partner "immediately," the Pasquin Estate attempted to argue in its Reply that
Mrs. Pasquin's partnership claims should still be dismissed because John Pasquin did not consent
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to the admission of Mrs. Pasquin as a partner. However, this assertion of fact was not supported
by any affidavit submitted by the Pasquin Estate ~ which should have barred the Estate from
even making this argument. But, more importantly, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony that John
Pasquin had in fact consented to her admission as a partner completely disputed this factual
assertion. Mrs. Pasquin's version of the facts in this regard must be assumed to be true for the
purposes of the motions. Consequently, the defendants' motions for summary judgment relating
to Mrs. Pasquin's partnership claims should have been denied.
With respect to Mrs. Pasquin's oral employment-for-life claim, the defendants argued
that this claim is clearly unenforceable without a writing under the Statute of Frauds because any
such agreement would clearly involve performance over a period of more than one year.
However, Mrs. Pasquin pointed out in her very first opposing memorandum that there was in fact
a writing signed by the partnership and corporation — their answers to interrogatories — which
admitted that Mrs. Pasquin had been promised lifetime employment and that John Pasquin had
reaffirmed that agreement in the meeting at the Duffin attorneys' office. Those answers to
interrogatories, as a matter of law, satisfied the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The
defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to the employment-for-life agreement
should have been denied for this reason alone.
Even if the Statute of Frauds otherwise somehow appeared to be applicable and a bar to
Mrs. Pasquin's claims in these two claimed regards, there are at least two recognized exceptions
to the Statute of Frauds: "partial performance" and "estoppel." If Mrs. Pasquin's opposing
verified statements of disputed fact would support a finding by a jury that either of these
exceptions applied in this case, the motions for summary judgment should have been denied.
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Mrs. Pasquin's sworn statements of disputed fact clearly supported these exceptions as argued by
Mrs. Pasquin in her opposing memoranda. It was reversible error therefore to grant the
defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Even if Mrs. Pasquin's partnership claims and employment-for-life claims had been
barred by the Statute of Frauds, her other claims should not have been dismissed. If Mrs.
Pasquin was not entitled to be an employee for life, she still was an employee at will who was
entitled to be paid currently and prior to termination pursuant to the parties' agreement as to
remuneration and perquisites due her. She certainly should have been allowed to sue for breach
of her employment agreement as to these issues. She is also entitled to seek damages for her
claims that the partnership and/or new corporation were improperly induced to breach their
agreements with her with respect to the payment of her salary and taxes. She is also entitled to
pursue her claims for damages arising from the alleged intentional and/or negligent infliction of
emotional distress. All of these claims were improperly dismissed regardless of the outcome of
the Statute of Frauds defense and whether or not there was an enforceable oral partnership
interest or employment-for-life agreement..
Judge Fredericks prematurely executed the Pasquin Defendants' summary judgment
(because he did not wait for the time to run for Mrs. Pasquin to submit her objections thereto),
and then incorrectly ruled that Mrs. Pasquin's objection thereto was untimely. This ruling and
Judge Fredericks' ruling denying Mrs. Pasquin's Motion for Reconsideration and to Vacate
incorrectly applied the rules to the facts and should be reversed.
At the very least, Mrs. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motions should have been granted and a
ruling on the defendants' motions delayed until after the Pasquin Defendants had produced the
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requested documents to the plaintiff and submitted themselves for their previously noticed
depositions. It was an abuse of discretion and clear error for Judge Fredericks to have denied
plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motions.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal seeks reversal of Judge Frederick's orders granting summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. Summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine issues of
material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56 (c) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Because entitlement to summary judgment is a matter of law,
this Court accords no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented.
Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P. 2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). This Court determines "whether
the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that
there were no disputed issues of material fact." State v. Ferre. 784 P. 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)
The trial court's determination as to whether an objection was timely or not involves the
application of law. Similarly, whether a verified statement of disputed facts is the functional
equivalent of an affidavit is a question of law. Such legal detenninations are given no deference
but are reviewed for correctness.
Because a motion for summary judgment denies a litigant its day in court, the trial court
must carefully scrutinize the documents submitted. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P. 2d 1266 (Utah
1976) If, after such scrutiny, the "evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact which, if
resolved in favor of the non-moving party, would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law, "
the motion must be denied. Jackson v. Dabney. 645 P. 2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). Where
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reasonable minds could differ, a genuine issue of fact exists. Id In addition, all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party -- Mrs. Pasquin. Beehive Brick Co.
v.Robinson Brick Co., 780 P. 2d 827 (Utah App. 1989).
A proper application of these rules and cases to the facts herein requires the reversal of
Judge Fredericks' orders as requested by Mrs. Pasquin herein.
II.

MRS. PASQUIN'S VERIFIED STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS
WAS PROPER AND CLEARLY SUPPORTED HER CLAIMS AND
OPERATED TO EFFECTIVELY DISPUTE THE DEFENDANTS'
MATERIAL FACTS

A.

It Was Procedurally and Substantively Impermissible for the
Defendants to Attempt to Contradict, and for Judge Frederick
to Ignore, the Allegations of Mrs. Pasquin's Complaint

The Pasquin Estate's first motion for summary judgment, joined in by all the other
defendants, began as essentially a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Pasquin Estate did
not submit any affidavits. It merely referenced the allegations of Mrs. Pasquin's complaint, and
argued that even assuming that those allegations were true, Mrs. Pasquin's claims were barred by
the Statute of Frauds. As such, the trial court and the parties were required to assume to be true
all of the allegations of Mrs. Pasquin's complaint. URCP, Rule 12(c)
Each of the other defendants joined in this original motion for summary judgment. None
of their memoranda contained any new or additional "statement of undisputed facts" sections in
the form required by CJA, 4-501(2)(a). All of the motions for summary judgment were bound,
therefore, by the Pasquin Estate's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" - which as indicated above
referred only to the allegations of Mrs. Pasquin's complaint. Consequently, procedurally and
substantively, none of the defendants should have been allowed to submit any affidavits
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attempting to contradict the factual allegations in Mrs. Pasquin's complaint - if one is required
to assume the allegations to be true, it is not logically possible nor substantively permissible to
attempt to dispute them.
CJA 4-501(2)(a) and (b) are instructive in this regard and state in part:
(a) The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment
shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as
to which movant contends no genuine issue exists....
(b)... All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported
by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose
of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's
statement.

Furthermore, URCP 56(e) states in part that:
... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading...."
A party moving for summary judgment must set forth all material facts upon which the
motion depends in his or her statement of undisputed facts. Otherwise, the opposing party is
under no obligation to dispute the same. It is procedurally improper to submit facts only in
affidavits purporting to support a motion for summary judgment without having first set them
forth in the movants' statement of undisputed facts.
This means that none of the motions should have gone beyond a determination of the
purely legal issue of whether, assuming Mrs. Pasquin's factual allegations to be true, her claims
were barred by the application of the Statute of Frauds. Mrs. Pasquin was entitled to rely upon
the allegations of her complaint, whether verified or not, in opposing the motions. Judge
Frederick's orders granting summary judgment must all be reversed because he did not clearly
27

and unequivocally keep the consideration of affidavit testimony which purported to contradict
Mrs. Pasquin's version of the facts from affecting his decision making process. This is
particularly demonstrated by the fact that if he had assumed Mrs. Pasquin's "Statement of
Disputed Facts" to be true as required, he would have been required to deny the motions for
summary judgment.
B.

It Was Not Improper For Mrs, Pasquin To Incorporate by Reference
In Her Statement of Disputed Facts the Factual Averments of Her
Complaint

As argued in the previous section, it may well be that Mrs. Pasquin was procedurally not
required to submit a true CJA 4-501(2)(b) "statement of disputed facts," since the original and
subsequent motions for summary judgment on the face of their memoranda were in actuality
motions for judgment on the pleadings. However, when the process became somewhat
"polluted" by the defendants' submittal of affidavits purporting to contradict the factual
allegations in Mrs. Pasquin's complaint, it was logical and certainly not improper for Mrs.
Pasquin to specifically incorporate the allegations of her complaint by reference in the
"Statement of Disputed Facts" section of her opposing memorandum. The defendants have not,
nor can they, cite any rule or case holding which prohibits such an incorporation by reference.
The defendants could have argued (but did not) the evidentiary sufficiency of the specific
language incorporated by reference into the statement of disputed facts, but they cannot claim
that one cannot incorporate matters by reference into such a statement. Incorporation by
reference is a well-recognized and understood process in legal drafting.
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C.

A Sworn Verification of a Statement of Disputed Facts is the
Functional Equivalent of Submitting An Affidavit Opposing
Summary Judgment

When Mrs. Pasquin formally verified the truthfulness of the allegations of her
complaint under oath as a part of her verification of the "Statement of Disputed Facts," those
allegations ceased to be "mere allegations ... of [her] pleadings." URCP 56(e) Rather, they
became part of a sworn submittal of factual information in opposition to the motions for
summary judgment — which is the functional equivalent of an opposing affidavit. It is well
established that a verified statement of fact is the equivalent of an affidavit. It was reversible
error for Judge Frederick to have entered orders granting the motions for summary judgment of
the Duffin and Pasquin Defendants based in part upon the finding that Mrs. Pasquin had not
properly opposed the factual bases of those motions.
D.

Mrs. Pasquin's Statements of Disputed Facts Sufficiently
Supported Her Claims

None of the motions for summary judgment challenged Mrs. Pasquin's claims for relief
on any legal basis other than the application of the Statute of Frauds. Furthermore, the factual
allegations of Mrs. Pasquin's complaint were and are on their face sufficient to support Mrs.
Pasquin's legal theories for relief. Consequently, absent a finding that the Statute of Frauds bars
her claims, it would have been, and Mrs. Pasquin believes it was, reversible error to grant
summary judgment dismissing her claims.
E.

Mrs. Pasquin's Statements of Disputed Facts Disputed all of the
Defendants' Improper Affidavit Testimony

Even though it should not have been allowed, the defendants attempted to assert facts via
their various affidavits or otherwise upon which they argued that Judge Frederick could grant
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their motions for summary judgment. However, Mrs. Pasquin's verified Statements of Disputed
Facts clearly placed all of these factual matters in dispute such that the motions for summary
judgment should have been denied.
For example, the Pasquin Estate first attempted to argue that Mrs. Pasquin became a
partner over time such that the Statute of Frauds should bar her suit. But, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn
testimony contradicted this by stating that she was made a partner immediately. The Pasquin
Estate then argued that even if Kory Pasquin had promised and/or attempted to make Mrs.
Pasquin a partner in Quality Parts, Utah law requires that all partners consent to the admission of
a new partner, and that John Pasquin (without any supporting affidavit) had not consented to
Mrs. Pasquin becoming a partner. This statement of fact was disputed by Mrs. Pasquin's sworn
testimony that John Pasquin was aware of and consented to her being admitted as a partner in
Quality Parts. None of the motions for summary judgment could have been granted on the "lack
of consent" grounds.
The Duffin Defendants similarly submitted their affidavits purporting to establish that
Mrs. Pasquin was never a partner in Quality Parts, that they never considered her a client, and
that they were not aware of any document which purported to grant Mrs. Pasquin lifetime
employment, among other things. Based thereon, they argued that Mrs. Pasquin could not
prevail on her claims, including her claims against them for breach of fiduciary duty, interference
with contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn
testimony states that she was made a partner, that she did consider them to be her attorneys, that
she was promised lifetime employment, and such. Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony disputed all
material facts argued by the Duffin Defendants in their motion.
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The Pasquin Defendants similarly submitted an affidavit of John Pasquin in which he
stated that he had never agreed to Mrs. Pasquin being a partner or shareholder in the new
corporation, that she had always been nothing more than a mere employee of the partnership and
new corporation, and that Mrs. Pasquin had in actuality been more of a "charity case" than a
significant contributor to the business, and the like. Again, Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony
disputed all of these factual assertions.
With all of these factual matters squarely placed in dispute, the motions for summary
judgment could not and should not have been granted. Judge Frederick's orders granting
summary judgment should be reversed.
m.

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO RULE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THAT MRS. PASQUIN'S ORAL PARTNERSHIP CLAIMS WERE
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

The Utah Statute of Frauds states in part as follows:
U.C.A. 25-5-4 "Certain agreements void unless in written and signed.
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or
memorandum of the agreement is in writing, signed by the party to be charged
with the agreement:
(1) every agreement which by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making of the agreement.

The defendants all argued that this language barred Mrs. Pasquin from asserting that she had
been granted an interest in the oral partnership, Quality Parts, ostensibly because the partnership
contemplated existing and operating for more than a year.
A.

An Oral Partnership Is Not Rendered Unenforceable Simply Because
it Contemplates Operating, or In Fact Does Operate, For Longer
Than One Year

The defendants' motions must be denied because they urge an improper construction of
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the phrase "is not to be performed within one year." It is well-established law that partnerships
can be oral and that the granting of an interest in a partnership can be oral. If such partnership
agreements are rendered unenforceable simply because the parties are going to be and/or are
partners for longer than one year, untold numbers of partnership agreements will be adversely
affected. The answer lies in the phrase "agreement... to be perform within one year." A
partnership can operate for longer than a year and a partner can become a partner for longer than
one year. But a partner cannot enforce, for example, an agreement to become a partner which
lasts longer than one year to perform and/or complete. It was reversible error to grant the
defendants' motions for summary judgment simply because Mrs. Pasquin, Kory Pasquin and
John Pasquin contemplated being partners in Quality Parts for longer than one year.
B.

Mrs. Pasquin's Sworn Averments That She Was Made Partner
Immediately, and With the Knowledge and Consent of John Pasquin,
Precluded The Granting of Summary Judgment

Since Mrs. Pasquin's complaint and other sworn statements asserts that she became a
partner in Quality Parts immediately, the agreement by which she became a partner was not one
which was "not to be performed in one year." If Mrs. Pasquin's sworn version of the facts is
assumed to be true (as it must), the Statute of Frauds is not even applicable. The orders granting
summary judgment should therefore be reversed.
C.

Mrs. Pasquin Identified Legal Exceptions to the Statute of Frauds,
Supported by Her Sworn Statements of Disputed Facts, Which
Precluded the Granting of Summary Judgment

Even if the Statute of Frauds were applicable, there can be exceptions thereto. The
verified complaint states that Mrs. Pasquin contributed her time and talents to the business after
she was made a partner therein in reliance on the representations that she was a partner and
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would have life-time employment upon terms essentially equivalent to that of Kory and John.
Her compensation and tax returns were handled in a fashion that demonstrates the accuracy of
these assertions. Assuming these facts for the purposes of the motions for summary judgment, a
jury could reasonably find that the doctrines of "partial performance" and "equitable estoppel"
precluded the defendants from prevailing on a Statute of Frauds defense. As the Court stated in
Jacobsonv.Cox. 202 P. 2d 714 (Utah 1949):
"Closely allied to the principles of protection against the assertion of the statute of frauds
to accomplish a fraud upon the party who has acted in reliance upon an oral contract or the
assertion of the statute as a shield to protect fraud is the doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute.
It is universally conceded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked to preclude a
party to a contract from asserting the unenforceability of a contract by reason of the fact that it is
not in writing as required by the statute of frauds. As is often said, the statute of frauds may be
rendered inoperative by an estoppel in pais. Where one has acted to his detriment solely in
reliance on an oral agreement, an estoppel may be raised to defeat the defense of the statute of
frauds. This is based upon the principle established in equity, and applying in every transaction
where the statute is invoked, that the statute of frauds, having been enacted for the purpose of
preventing fraud, shall not be made the instrument of shielding, protecting, or aiding the party
who relies upon it in the perpetration of a fraud or in the consummation of a fraudulent scheme.
It is called into operation to defeat what would be an unconscionable use of the statute, and
guards against the utilization of the statute as a means for defrauding innocent persons who have
been induced or permitted to change their position in reliance upon oral agreements within its
operation. Id. at 722-23.
In the Jacobson case the Court found that the parties were all familiar with the agreement that
had been made, had acted for years in accordance with said agreements, and as such were
estopped from even raising a Statute of Frauds defense.
As Mrs. Pasquin argued in her opposing memoranda, Mrs. Pasquin could prevail against
the defendants' Statute of Frauds defense at trial herein on these theories. She acted in reliance
upon the representations that she was a partner in Quality Parts. John was at all times aware of
and consented to Kory making Mrs. Pasquin a partner and promising her life-time employment
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(as acknowledged by the interrogatory answers). Mrs. Pasquin was treated as a partner both
before and after the formation of the corporation - up until Kory died and John seized control of
the corporation. All of these facts were required to be assumed to be true for the purposes of the
motions for summary judgment. If true, afraudand great injustice would be perpetrated if the
defendants are allowed to assert the Statute of Frauds to assist them in depriving Mrs. Pasquin of
the fruits of her labor and that which she was promised and for which she had worked for many
years. Further, upon summary judgment, these fact-intensive issues cannot be and should not
have been resolved in defendants' favor. They can only be decided at trial. The trier of fact must
be allowed to determine if the defendants' Statue of Frauds defense is barred by estoppel and the
parties' partial performance.
IV.

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO RULE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THAT MRS. PASQUIN'S LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS WERE
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
A.

The Pasquin Defendants9 Answers to Interrogatories Satisfied the
Statute of Frauds With Respect to the Issue of Mrs. Pasquin's
Lifetime Employment Claims

Mrs. Pasquin's lifetime employment claims clearly could be affected by the application
of the Statute of Frauds because that was an agreement which was to be performed over a period
of time longer than one year. However, the Pasquin Defendants' interrogatory answers satisfied
the requirements of the Statute. They acknowledge that Kory did promise Mrs. Pasquin lifetime
employment, and were signed by a representative of the partnership and the new corporation. It
was reversible error for Judge Frederick to rule that the Statute of Frauds barred Mrs. Pasquin's
claims relating to a lifetime employment agreement when the defendants own answers to
interrogatories referenced and acknowledged the same.
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B.

Mrs. Pasquin Identified Legal Exceptions to the Statute of Frauds,
Supported by Her Sworn Statements of Disputed Facts, Which
Precluded the Granting of Summary Judgment

For the reasons set forth in section III. C , above, it was reversible error for Judge
Frederick to rule that Mrs. Pasquin could not prevail at trial against a Statute of Fraud defense as
to her claims to lifetime employment.
Further, the Pasquin Defendants' memorandum itself stated that:
"Under what circumstances, one may wonder, could a lifetime employment be found. In
Green v. Oliver Realty, Inc.. 526 A. 2d 1192 (PA. Super. 1987), the court found a contract where
the employee agreed to work for less than union scale in exchange for a contract for employment
for life. The court concluded that although a promise of lifetime employment should not be
enforced merely on the basis of the promise itself, such a promise would be enforced if the
surrounding circumstances indicated that the parties truly intended to overcome the presumption
of employment-at-will or if there were additional considerations." R. 128
Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony satisfied the requirements of the defendants' own cited
case. She worked extraordinary hours at only minimum wage rather than market rate. Further,
the Pasquin Defendants' answers to interrogatories clearly indicate that "the parties intended to
overcome the presumption of employment at will." Not only do these interrogatory answers
acknowledge that the promise had been made, but they docment the Pasquin Defendants'
reaffirmation of the agreement at the meeting at the Duffin Defendants' office. These factually
intensive issues can only be resolved at trial.
V.

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO DISMISS ALL OF MRS. PASQUIN'S
CLAIMS

Even if the Statute of Frauds were a bar to Mrs. Pasquin's claims to a partnership interest
and in lifetime employment, Mrs. Pasquin was nevertheless an employee of the business and
entitled to be paid at all times prior to the termination of her employment strictly in accordance
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with the parties' agreements as to remuneration and perquisites. Mrs. Pasquin was entitled to be
free from having individuals induce her employer to breach her employment agreement in these
regards. Mrs. Pasquin also was entitled to be free from being subjected to the intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Mrs. Pasquin's complaint alleged that the defendants
breached her contract with respect to wages, perquisites and the withholding, accounting and
payment of her taxes. Mrs. Pasquin's complaint alleged that certain defendants interfered with
her employment agreement and induced her employer to breach the agreement in these regards.
Finally, Mrs. Pasquin's complaint alleged that the defendants committed acts which constituted
the intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. It was reversible error for these
claims to have been dismissed through the granting of the defendants' motions for summary.
VI.

MRS. PASQUIN'S OBJECTION TO THE PASQUIN DEFENDANTS'
PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT
UNTIMELY

With respect to the timeliness of Mrs. Pasquin's objection to the proposed order granting
the Pasquin Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the following chronology and argument
are illustrative:
1.

The proposed order was mailed to Mrs. Pasquin on October 23, 1997 (see mailing

certificate attached to the proposed order);
2.

CJA, Rule 4-504 requires plaintiff to submit any objection within "five days;"

3.

Under URCP, Rule 6 (a), whenever a time period "is less than seven days,

intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation;"
4.

Under URCP, Rule 6(e), since the proposed order was mailed, three days are

added to the time period;
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5.

This means that Mrs. Pasquin had eight (5+3) days to object, and weekends and

holidays are not counted — which means that the objection was not due until Tuesday,
November, 4, 1997;
6.

Mrs. Pasquin served her objection upon defendants by mail and fax on Monday,

November 3,1997 (before the deadline) in conformance with URCP, Rule 5(b) ("Service by mail
is complete upon mailing")(see mailing certificate attached to Mrs. Pasquin's objection and
Exhibit B attached hereto);
7.

The plaintiff mailed the objection to the court on November 3, 1997 in

conformance with URCP, Rule 5(d)("All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a
party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time thereafter"
(see copy of the letter to the clerk accompanying the objection, attached hereto as part of Exhibit
b);
8.

The objection was not literally filed and stamped by the Clerk of the Court until

November 6,1997;
9.

Judge Frederick signed the prof

Summary Judgment on November 3, 1997 ~

before the time to object had even run.
Consequently, it was error for Judge Frederick to execute the order granting the Pasquin
Defendants summary judgment on November 3,1997, then to rule in the November 18,1997
minute entry that Mrs. Pasquin's objection was untimely, and then to deny Mrs. Pasquin's
motion for reconsideration.
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VII.

IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CLEARLY ERRONEOUS TO
DENY MRS. PASQUIN'S RULE 56(F) MOTIONS

At the time that the subject motions for summary judgment were filed, the Pasquin
Defendants had not produced any documents nor submitted themselves for deposition. The
requested but not produced documents and other discovery were likely highly relevant to these
motions. Mrs. Pasquin had not delayed nor refused to engage in discovery. She had merely
graciously acquiesced in the Pasquin Defendants' requests to postpone discovery until John
Pasquin's health improved. Rule 56(f) provides that if a party opposing a motion for summary
judgment asserts that he or she really needs certain discovery to be able to fully and fairly oppose
a motion for summary judgment, a ruling on the summary judgment should be postponed until
the requested discovery is undertaken and/or completed.
Only the Pasquin Defendants have the corporate and other business documents. Mrs.
Pasquin cannot rebut their claims that there are "no documents" supporting her claims without
being able to review the Pasquin Defendants' documents. This was the classic case where Rule
56(f) should be employed and relief granted. It was an abuse of discretion and clear error for
Judge Frederick to rule that Mrs. Pasquin was not entitled to Rule 56(f) relief because she could
have undertaken discovery but did not. This purported "fact" was simply untrue.
At the very least, the orders granting summary judgment should be reversed and Mrs.
Pasquin given the opportunity to pursue and complete her requested and critically relevant
discovery. Mrs. Pasquin should thereafter be allowed to supplement her oppositions as she sees
fit, and then the motions can be ruled upon.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff/appellant Geri Pasquin respectfully requests that this
Court (1) reverse Judge Frederick's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants
in their entirety, or (2) reverse that portion of Judge Frederick's orders granting summary
judgment as to the claims not automatically resolved by the Statute of Frauds challenge, or (3)
reverse Judge Frederick's ruling regarding the timeliness of objections and the computation of
time with respect thereto, and/or (4) at the very least, set aside the orders granting summary
judgment, find that Mrs. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion should have been granted, and directing
that the motions not be ruled upon until the requested relevant discovery is completed and Mrs.
Pasquin has had an opportunity to supplement her oppositions accordingly.
DATED this 28th day of August, 1998.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of
correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be
hand-delivered by
fax and/or by
Kipp & Christian, P.C.
Attn: Carman E. Kipp
10 Exchange Place - Newhouse Building
Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
FAX 359-9004

,I&L

I caused two true and
X (
ed, postage prepaid; and/or
courier; addressed to
Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey
Attn: Steven L. Taylor
124 South 600 East, #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
FAX 533-8508

Robert Copier
243 East 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
FAX 531-7928
>

£p<3~—
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ADDENDA/EXHIBITS

A -- Third-Party Affidavits Re Oral Agreements
B — Copies of Letters/FAX Confirmation Sheets re
Mrs. Pasquin's Service of Her Objection to the
Propose Order Granting Summary Judgment to
The Pasquin Defendants

41

Exhibit A
Third-Party Affidavits Re Oral Agreements
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AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTIE DAWN MADSEN

I, Kristie Dawn Madsen, under penalty of perjury I declare the following:
1.

I am a resident of the State of Utah, and if called to testify at trial would state the

following of my own personal knowledge.
2.

I first met Kory Pasquin in August of 1994 when he came to Madsen Transport,

where I worked at that time, to borrow a fork lift. Shortly thereafter I began to date Mr. Pasquin.
Soon we became intimate and off and on lived together until his death in October 1996. I
became pregnant with Mr. Pasquin child, and gave birth to his daughter on February 5, 1996,
who I named Karly. I lived in the apartment at Quality Parts from March of 1996 until October
of 1996. Some of my personal belongings are still located at Quality Parts. I worked at Quality
Parts in April and May of 1996.
3.

During this relationship, Mr. Pasquin talked often about his business. Quality

Parts, and his relationship with his father, John Pasquin, and mother, Geri Pasquin. During these
conversations, Mr. Pasquin told me that John and Geri were his partners and had helped him
build up the business. He said numerous times that the business would never have been
successful without John and Geri. He told me that John was not "business oriented" enough to
run the business, and that without Geri handling the office and other business affairs they would
never have been successful. He told me that his goal was to build the business up to the point
that he could sell it so that Geri, from her share of the three-way split of the proceeds of the sale,
would be able to retire.

Mr. Pasquin told me that he would probably keep the building for

retirement but keep working.
4.

When I was at Quality Parts, I saw and heard John and Kory talking about

business decisions many times, during which one or the other would say that they had "better
talk to Geri" to get her opinion and vote on the matter. I saw the three of them often meet to
discuss and decide business matters. It was always clear to me that John, Kory and Geri were
equal partners, with equal say and influence in the business. At no time did I ever see John say
or do anything which suggested in any way that Geri was not an equal partner, or did not have an
equal vote, in the business. This was true both before and after the business was incorporated.
In witness whereof I set my hand this 7th day of March, 1997.

My Commission Expires:

/%s/

oft, #Cto

Exhibit B
Copies of Letters/FAX Confirmation Sheets re
Mrs. Pasquin's Service of Her Objection to the
Propose Order Granting Summary Judgment to
The Pasquin Defendants
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BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN
A Profatsloaal Law Corporation

Laird U w Office:
1600 Laird Avenue
Salt Lak* City, Utah I410S
{101)5814737
Pax 512-4737

P1«M 7-21 Law Office:
675 E«§t 2100 South, Suit* 350
Silt Uka City, Utah S4106
(§01)481=3707
Fax 415-7140

November 3, 1997

Third District Court, Division I
Salt Lake Department
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re*
Geri Pasquin v John Pasquin; Jimmie Pasquin: The Estate of Koiy Pasquin:
Quality Parts, a Utah general partnership, et al
Case No 970900011CV
Dear Clerk.
Enclosed forfilingyou willfindthe original Objection to Proposed Summary
Judgement of the Pasquin Defendants, for the above referenced case.
Please conform the copy of the Notice and send the document, to our office in the selfaddressed, stamped envelope I have provided for your convenience.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact our office.
Sincerely,

Melisar Hansen
Legal Assistant
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